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Abstract Recently businesses have been encouraged to discuss their business
models in their annual reports as a means of communicating their future intentions
to readers of their financial statements. At the same time, corporate governance has
continued to be a focus of attention. In this paper we set out the view that a useful
way of regarding corporate governance is that of custodianship of the business
model—by which we mean that the directors are responsible for sustaining and
developing a company’s business model. A comparison of corporate governance
and the activities required to sustain and develop the business model shows them to
be essentially the same. A business model view has the advantage that it unifies the
compliance and monitoring aspects of governance with the advisory and strategy-
setting roles of directors, roles that have sometimes been seen as conflicting.
Viewing corporate governance from a business model perspective highlights aspects
of board responsibilities that are not explicitly recognised in the UK Corporate
Governance Code and may have been neglected in the prevailing emphasis on
compliance, but which are intimately connected to both network relationships and
corporate culture which are now becoming a source of concern.
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1 Introduction
Although the last two decades have seen an increasing concern about issues of
corporate governance and the introduction of extensive codes and guidance to
address these issues, debate continues about the role and effectiveness of the board
of directors. Scandals, such as Volkswagen’s cheating on emissions testing and
Libor rigging at Barclays and other banks, have raised questions of directors’
responsibility for operational matters and ethical behaviour that seem peripheral to
corporate governance as it commonly characterised. At the same time, companies
are being required to describe their ‘business models’ in their annual reports and
some accounting measurements are based on them. In its draft conceptual
framework, the IASB (2015) believes that ‘business activities’ (its term for the
business model) affect the unit of account, accounting measurement, and
presentation and disclosure. The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC),
the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force of the Financial Stability Board, the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group and other bodies all draw on the business
model concept (Nielsen and Roslender 2015).
Considerable effort has been expended, and continues to be, on definitional
debate about what constitutes corporate governance and what business models are.
The report of the Cadbury Committee in 1992 characterised corporate
governance as ‘the system by which businesses are directed and controlled’, a
definition widely adopted but framed within the narrow remit of the Committee
which was related to the financial aspects of corporate governance The definition in
the 2004 OECD principles of corporate governance offered a different perspective:
‘‘Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders.’’ However, the
Cadbury Code ‘‘comply or explain’’ approach to corporate governance disclosure,
which is now firmly embedded in regulatory structures, retains a central focus on the
accountability role of board members.
A broad characterisation of business models is ‘how businesses create value’ but
a substantial literature has developed elaborating alternative views. There is a need
to distinguish between business models and how they are represented, although not
all scholars are able to maintain the distinction. For us, the model is a system that
comprises the activities of the business, its relationships with stakeholders and its
tangible and intangible assets and liabilities. The model can be represented in
different ways such as a diagram, a spreadsheet, a set of equations or a narrative.
Such representations are by their nature incomplete and focus on particular aspects
of the business’s activities and relationships.
For our purposes, precise definitions are unimportant; we argue that the use of a
business model perspective, based on key tasks which would be readily accepted as
fundamental to the operation of any business model, can highlight aspects of the
board’s role which, while widely viewed as central to board responsibility, have not
been clearly articulated in the UK corporate governance framework.
The paper first outlines some salient features of corporate governance and of the
business model concept and then identifies and compares the activities of corporate
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boards associated with corporate governance and those activities concerned with
sustaining and developing the business model. This comparison shows that they are
essentially the same and supports the argument that viewing corporate governance
through a business model lens provides a new and helpful approach to discussing
board responsibilities.
1.1 Corporate governance
Concern with the issues that now broadly fall within the scope of corporate
governance dates back to the middle of the twentieth century when the term first
appeared in legal and management discourse (Spira and Slinn 2013: xx).
Ocasio and Joseph (2005) used content analysis techniques to map the
development of the vocabulary of corporate governance in the United States from
1972 to 2003, noting that:
…the category of activities directly referred to as corporate governance shifted
from an initial focus on business and public policy and corporate social
responsibility to a concern with board organization, executives and decision
making. (Ocasio and Joseph 2005: 172)
Such a shift was consistent with the apparent inadequacy of accountability
mechanisms highlighted by financial scandals, which resulted in attempts to realign
board structures to emphasise directors’ responsibilities with regard to internal
control. However, this shift focused attention on compliance and internal structures
and processes, rather than the wider social context within which companies exist.
The focus on accountability within the Cadbury Code was challenged by critics
who believed that this could stifle enterprise (Spira 2001) as the Hampel
Committee’s revision of the Code made clear:
The importance of corporate governance lies in its contribution both to
business prosperity and to accountability. In the UK the latter has preoccupied
much public debate over the past few years. We would wish to see the balance
corrected…the emphasis on accountability has tended to obscure a board’s
first responsibility—to enhance the prosperity of the business over time.
(Hampel Committee 1998: 7)
Whether the changes in board structure and composition, such as the
establishment of audit committees and the increased number of independent non-
executive directors (NEDs), have contributed to any significant improvement in
corporate governance remains a moot point: there is little firm evidence to
demonstrate that they have been successful in improving oversight. Perhaps
implicitly acknowledging the ineffectiveness of such remedies, a further shift is now
taking place: recent concerns have been framed as deficiencies in corporate culture.1
1 See for example, the Financial Reporting Council’s Culture Project (https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/
Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/Culture-Project.aspx) and Grant Thornton’s 2015 report ‘‘Cor-
porate Governance: tone from the top’’ http://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/articles/corporate-
governance-2015/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=website&utm_campaign=Corporate%20governance%
202015.
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From the time of the Cadbury Committee’s report, conceptions of ‘‘good’’
corporate governance have been predicated on the assumption that governance and
management should be firmly separated. The roles of chairman and CEO should not
be held by the same individual (provision A.2.) and recent iterations of the UK
Corporate Governance Code prescribe that a CEO should not go on to become
chairman of the same company (provision A.3.1). Yet, paradoxically, the role of the
independent NED on a unitary board carries the same responsibilities as an
executive director but with the added requirement of oversight.
One of the earliest writers on corporate governance, Bob Tricker, classified board
activities into conformance and performance.
Conformance activities Performance activities
Outward looking Accountability Strategy formulation
Inward looking Supervising executive activities Policy making
Past/present focus Future focus
(Tricker 2012: 45).
While this is a convenient way to summarise the focus of board activities, the
four very broad categories suggest that there may be overlaps in practice: in
particular, the role of the independent non-executive director appears to straddle
both conformance and performance. Ezzamel and Watson (1997) argued that this
tension in the NED role was problematic and could not be sustained in practice, thus
preventing the Cadbury proposals for increasing the monitoring role of NEDs from
being effective. However, Roberts et al. (2005) explored the role in their work
supporting the Higgs Review of non executive directors and concluded that in
practice NEDs viewed their strategic contribution to the board and their oversight
activities as complementary: ‘‘Far from being an impediment to non-executive
independence, involvement and engagement inform its exercise’’ (S17).
While there is little evidence to tell us how much time boards typically spend on
each category of these four activities, it is quite possible that the expectation that
independent NEDs will exercise a significant monitoring role, coupled with
changing board structures over the last decade, would increase the focus of board
attention on compliance. Many boards are now predominantly non executive, with
the CEO and CFO the only executive members (described as ‘‘CEO-only’’ boards
by Joseph et al. 2014) and the main link to a separate executive management group.
While it appears that the boundary between corporate governance and management
is firmly established in this structure, published reports provide little indication of
how these two groups interact to undertake their roles.
In the next section we consider these activities in more detail by setting out the
key board tasks emphasised in current corporate governance requirements, and
reflecting on how they might be considered to sustain and develop the business
model. We then compare them to tasks which have been identified by scholars and
policy makers as key to sustaining and developing the business model.
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2 Business models
2.1 The nature of business models
Although we have said precise definition of business models is unimportant for this
paper, it is important to clarify what kind of a phenomenon ‘business models’ are. If
we consider a broad definition of a business model such as ‘the way a company
creates value’, does this comprise a set of physical and intangible resources together
with ways of doing business, relationships with stakeholders and other things, or is
it a description of these things in some form? Different scholars and bodies disagree.
This matters because when an organisation describes its business model, the
description may be different in kind depending on whether it is describing a set of
resources, etc. or whether it is describing a description of these things. To use an
analogy, a description of a vase of flowers is different from a description of a
painting of a vase of flowers. The painting and the vase of flowers are different in
kind. Similarly, a set of resources, etc. is different from a description of them (in
some form such as a diagram). This kind of ontological distinction is often glossed
over in speech but in scholarly discussion more precision is required and it is
important to avoid making category errors, when, for example, Venn diagrams are
constructed, so that they include only sets of items of the same kind.
To take the definitions of business models cited by Zott et al. (2011: 1024), these
include
• An architecture (which includes descriptions)
• A depiction (of the content, structure and governance of transactions) but also a
‘system of interdependent activities’
• A ‘heuristic logic’
• Stories
• A ‘concise representation of an interrelated set of variables’
• Four interlocking elements (customer value proposition, profit formula, key
resources, key processes)
• A ‘reflection of realized strategy’
• An articulation of ‘the logic, the data and other evidence that support a value
proposition for the customer…’
Most of these definitions are representations of some kind but they differ
according to the kinds of things they are representing. Some of the definitions are of
actual resources, processes and relationships. If business models are some kind of
representation or depiction of underlying resources, processes and relationships, a
phrase is needed to describe the phenomenon that results when these things operate
together and it is generally also called the ‘business model’. As for example the
IIRC does: ‘The term business model is defined herein as ‘‘the chosen system of
inputs, business activities, outputs and outcomes that aims to create value over the
short, medium and long term’’’ IIRC (2013: 1). It appears that scholars, regulators
and practitioners use the phrase to mean both the phenomenon and its
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representation. As noted above for present purposes we characterise a business
model as a system that comprises the activities of the business, its relationships with
stakeholders and its tangible and intangible assets and liabilities.
Regarding a business model as a description without reference to some
underlying substance conceals the possibility of dissonance with reality. There is
a need to distinguish between business models: (1) that the board would like the
business to have (the intended model); (2) business models as they happen (the
emergent model); and, (3) business models as described by the company in public
(the declared model). The three overlap (in most cases), but the areas of difference
may be at least as interesting as the common ground.
There can be at least three important differences:
The intended model versus the emergent model The board may fail to achieve its
intentions; there may be a misunderstanding of external and internal factors
operating on the business; external factors may change.
The intended model versus the declared model The business may make
incomplete or misleading disclosures about its model for proprietary reasons or
because its model depends on misleading one or more stakeholders; disclosures
about the business model may have been delegated without proper review of results
to junior staff or third parties who do not understand the model, or who, for
example, subordinate accuracy of disclosure to a neat diagram.
The emergent model versus the declared model The way the business is creating
value may be misunderstood or, as above, the declared model is incomplete or
misleading, or disclosures have been delegated.
Review of listed companies’ business model narratives quickly shows numerous
examples of disclosures which appear meaningless, or which subsequent events
prove to be unrepresentative of events as they were unfolding (Page 2014).
2.2 Business models and value
For the UK Corporate Governance Code the business model is ‘the basis on which
the company generates or preserves value’ whereas the IASB does not define the
term business model (which is used in IFRS 9) but in its statement of management
commentary (see ‘‘Appendix’’) refers to ‘the entity’s structure and how it creates
value’.2
The various descriptions of models have much in common with Wilson and
Chua’s (Wilson and Chua 1993: 23) depiction of the organisation as a ‘transformer
of contributions’ from various stakeholders. An adapted version of this is set out at
Table 1. Each group of stakeholders needs to be given sufficient inducement to
maintain their contribution to the organisation. The value created in excess of the
minimum stakeholder rewards to maintain viability (‘organisational slack’ or ‘value
surplus’) is allocated among the participants. Value creation is enabled by an
organisation’s ‘value proposition’—the combination of products and services that
provides customers, and possibly other stakeholders, with a consumer surplus and
2 Replacing a previous wording of the ‘entity’s structure and its economic model’ in the Exposure Draft
of the document.
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makes them willing to make payments or other contributions. So, for example, the
value proposition of a cheap printer and relatively expensive ink may attract a lot of
customers and generate more value for the supplier and its partners than pricing
each at conventional prices.
Haslam et al. (2015) also conceptualise business models using stakeholder theory
in order to critique the capital provider-focussed approach to financial reporting
adopted by the IASB (2015: 22). They consider both the size of the ‘value-pie’
created by the business model and the proportion of value captured by the
organisation.
Nielsen and Roslender (2015) survey some of the different characterisations and
conclude that while some commentators refer only to value creation, others discuss
both value creation and also value capture—how value is captured by the business
and transmitted to shareholders. Accounting scholars have tended to focus on how
value is measured and deemed available for distribution to shareholders (realisation)
(Beattie and Smith 2013).
A key feature of the concept of business models is the role played by networks.
Networks are coalitions of long term stakeholders which not only undertake
mutually beneficial transactions but may also build up knowledge and knowhow
that provides long term competitive advantage because of the difficulty that
competitors would have in replicating the relationships. Value creation is a systemic
property as it arises from the firm’s resources and the properties of the network of
stakeholders (Zott et al. 2011).
Value captured is the value surplus held within the business or distributed to
shareholders. In this view, the business model becomes the transformation process
whereby stakeholder inputs are returned as rewards.
It should not be assumed that organisations are always as successful in capturing
value as naı¨ve economic theory would suggest. UK Premier League football clubs
are a notable case in point: the value created through gate money and tv deals has
largely been appropriated by star players rather than being retained by clubs. In the
USA, sports people, although very well paid, have not been so successful in
capturing the value created by, for example, American football. Similarly in banks
and other financial institutions large parts of value are diverted to the bonus pool for
a few employees rather than to shareholders.
This transformation process view of the organisation has similarity with the
idea of the organisation as a nexus or ‘network of contracts’ (Jensen and
Meckling 1976) but whereas the nexus of contracts formulation has been used to
argue that some organisations are ownerless and corporate responsibility illusory,
we argue that, by viewing the role of the board as custodians of the business
model/transformation process, corporate responsibility is enhanced rather than
diminished.
Strategic planning is usually conceived of as hierarchical, linear and static. The
process proceeds from Mission to Objectives to Identification of Options to
Selection of Options to Implementation (see for example Stoner and Wankel 1986:
124; Steiner and Miner 1982: 109). By contrast business model design is cyclical,
dynamic, path dependent and evolutionary (Teece 2010; Demil and Lecocq 2010).
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Beattie and Smith (2013) describe the business model concept as ‘holistic, multi-
level, boundary-spanning and dynamic’. Whereas strategy is essentially static—
organisations move from one set of strategies to another as circumstances change—
business models are dynamic in the sense that models incorporate the need to
change strategy in order to maintain competitive advantage.
For Zott et al. (2011), business models form a new unit of analysis, or a different
‘chunking’ (Hofstadter 1980: 285 et seq) of concepts that can give rise to useful
insights.
Having outlined some important aspects of the business model concept as
discussed by scholars and regulators, in the next section we draw on the UK
corporate governance framework to identify current characterisations of board
responsibility.
3 Key tasks
In this section we set out the key tasks of corporate governance as characterised by
the UK Corporate Governance Code (UKCGC, 2014) and compare these with the
key tasks entailed in sustaining and developing the business model.
The Key Principles (KPs) of the UKCGC are mainly concerned with how the
board manages itself but the elaboration of those principles explains more about the
tasks of boards in directing and controlling the business.
The following list shows the tasks of the board so far as UKCGC (2014) is
concerned.
3.1 The board’s role in key corporate governance tasks
Conformance
• Establishing culture value and ethics (Preface §4)
• Maintaining sound risk management and internal control systems (KP C
‘Accountability’)
• Meeting information needs of investors and engaging with shareholders (KP C
‘Accountability’ and KP E ‘Relations with shareholders’) Explaining the
business model (SP C.1.2)
• Aligning executive remuneration with long term success (KP D ‘Remuneration’)
• Maintaining an effective board. (KP A ‘Leadership’, KP B ‘Effectiveness’)
Reviewing management performance and that of the board and individual
directors (SP B6)
Performance
• Setting strategic aims (SP A1). Constructively challenging and helping develop
proposals on strategy (SP A4)
• Determining risk appetite in achieving strategic objectives (KP C
‘Accountability’)
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• Ensuring adequate financial and human resources (SP A1). Overseeing senior
appointments (SP B2)
(KP = Key Principle, SP = Supplementary Principle in UKCGC).
The list above demonstrates that although corporate governance is sometimes
narrowly regarded as confined to monitoring and control of management’s actions in
order to ensure that they are in the best interests of stakeholders, a much wider set of
activities is now comprised by governance, even in the UKCGC. In their Department
of Trade and Industry sponsored review of UK corporate governance Filatochev et al.
(2006: 16) identify four functions of the board: monitoring and control; strategic
advice; network relationships; and, resource acquisition (where, in the terms of
resource dependency theory, ‘resources’ can include network relationships).
Comparing this categorisation to that of Tricker above emphasises the more recent
focus on the importance of the board’s role with regard to external relationships.
3.2 Key business model tasks
There is little previous scholarship on the role of the Board relative to a firm’s business
model. There is a considerable volume of strategic management literature but we have
found nothing that adopts a businessmodel approach to the responsibilities of the board.
To undertake an analysis, we have drawn from different sources to derive our own
synthesis of the activities necessary for a board to sustain and develop the organisation’s
business model. The components of the business model that have been identified are
resources (physical, intangible and human), relationships and a proposition for the
creating and capture of value. At any point in time,much of the task ofmanagement is to
sustain and control these components. Physical and intangible resources need to be
safeguardedmaintained and replenished and human resources need to bemotivated and
controlled. Relationships with external stakeholders need to be maintained and
enhanced and the value proposition needs to be monitored, evaluated and ‘tweaked’.
Because business models are dynamic, sustaining activities and developmental
ones are intermingled (Osterwalder et al. 2005) but the role of the board needs to be
forward-looking to see what changes are needed to adapt the value proposition (and
hence the required resources and relationships) to anticipated changes in the
business environment. One way of conceptualising this is to look to the strategic
role of the board, but another is to look at it in terms of business models. The
business model perspective is more holistic and continuous than a strategic view.
3.3 The board’s role in sustaining and developing the business model: key
tasks sustaining the BM
• Overseeingmanagement control systems (see e.g., Merchant andVan der Stede 2012)
• Personnel controls including cultural and ethical values
• Internal control systems including results and action controls
• Risk measurement and control
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• Ensuring provision of physical, financial, human and other resources (IIRC
2013)
• Maintaining key relationships with stakeholders
• Monitoring and reacting to the impact of internal and external developments on
the value proposition (Johnson et al. 2008). Sustaining competitive advantage
(Teece 2010)
3.4 Developing the BM (Demil and Lecocq 2010)
• Ensuring provision of resources for investment
• Overseeing development of ‘competences’
• Reviewing changes to the value proposition
• Overseeing internal and external organisation changes
• Reviewing and controlling revenues and costs
Langfield Smith (2005) reviews the extent to which management control is
dependent on business strategy and identifies the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and
Norton 1996) as a development that explicitly ties performance measurement and
control to a company’s business model. The extensive literature on control and
strategy emphasises the need to coordinate management control systems with
strategy and management control systems must therefore have a key role in
sustaining business models. Merchant and Van der Stede (2012) divide controls into
results, action and personnel controls and, although other authors have sliced things
differently, this is a convenient classification.
From an economic perspective the problem of value creation is bound up with
creating a sustainable competitive advantage—the source of economic rents. There
are various routes open to achieving this by ensuring that competitors cannot
replicate the firm’s business model. This can be achieved for example by patents,
secret know-how, brand investment or cementing relationships. Maintenance of the
advantage requires continual monitoring and investment of time and resources. A
further route to sustaining competitive advantage is perpetual innovation in the
value proposition and the business model. This process is risky, but in most
industries inevitable, since competitors’ innovations will eventually erode compet-
itive advantage maintained in other ways. One of the dangers is that innovation can
make existing products, services and ways of doing business less desirable and thus
cannibalise a firm’s existing business model. For example, introduction of an on-
line shopping channel may take business away from a firm’s bricks and mortar
stores. Successful distance learning modules may reduce demand for a university’s
face to face delivery of courses.3
Despite the explicitly dynamic nature of business models, the process of
designing them is often described in the same top down static mode as strategy
3 It may be remarked that the face to face delivery mode is a remarkable business model for education
that has survived for over a thousand years and innovations such as printing and distance learning seem
not to have reduced demand.
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development (e.g., Zott and Amit 2010). A more evolutionary perspective is taken
in the ‘transformational review’ of Demil and Lecocq (2010) which addresses the
question of how models evolve. They suggest that successful business models are
seldom conceived fully formed and are the result of a process of refinement and
development. In Demil and Lecocq’s framework, a business model has components:
value proposition; resources (physical and human) and competences; and organ-
isation (including external relationships). The combination of the components
generates revenues and costs. Developing the business model therefore entails
changes to the components either singly or in combination.
4 Comparing the board’s role in corporate governance tasks
and in sustaining and developing the business model
The two summaries above show very clear parallels: they both require
• Ensuring provision of physical, intangible and human resources
• Informing investors and maintaining relations with shareholder
• Establishing culture values and ethics
• Maintaining sound risk management and internal control systems
It is clear that a company cannot achieve objectives or operate its business
model effectively without adequate resources and oversight of provision of
resources is implicit in both governance and business model approaches. Informing
investors is explicit in the UKCGC but is included in maintaining key relationships
with stakeholders. Neither list gives great prominence to establishing culture,
values and ethics although recent events such as the Volkswagen scandal may
cause regulators to concentrate on it more (Anderson 2015) and there is already
evidence of this in the FRC project mentioned in footnote 2. The reasons for
paying attention to culture may differ according to the theory of the firm adopted.
For example, for agency theorists, culture, values and ethics may be a convenient
and effective control mechanism that helps prevent opportunistic behaviour,
whereas for people taking a stakeholder view of the firm, culture, values and ethics
are needed to give proper weight to the rights and needs of the different
stakeholder groups.
Risk management and internal control systems provided an early stumbling block
for the development of corporate governance codes (Spira and Page 2003), but it is
now clear that maintaining management control is a responsibility of the board.
Similarly, although writers on business models have tended to concentrate on
definitional, classification and design issues, risk and management control are
activities implicit in the implementation of business models.
There are, however, two important ways in which the approaches seem to differ:
• Setting strategic aims and overseeing strategy
• Maintaining external relationships
M. Page, L. F. Spira
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While many directors might give strategy setting a high priority in any list of
functions, it is not flagged as a main principle of governance by UKCGC, although
it is included as a supplementary principle. In the business model literature, strategy
formation is not usually identified as a separate activity because, as noted
previously, the business model approach bundles functions that include strategy
formation differently. It is one of the virtues of the business model approach that it
resolves uncertainty about the board’s role in relation to strategy.
The UKCGC does not require directors to take responsibility for relationships
with stakeholders other than shareholders. The development of the code took place
at a time of contested views of directors’ responsibilities and the code was framed
with an investor focussed view. By this means the question of according rights to
other stakeholders was avoided. In contrast, the key role of external relationships in
the business model approach makes board responsibility for overseeing relation-
ships inescapable. Filatochev et al. (2006) make it clear that independent directors
have an important role to play in the process and may themselves be responsible for
cementing important relationships through, for example, interlocking directorships.
Comparing these lists raises questions about the boundary line between corporate
governance and management. As noted above, the rise of independent boards (CEO-
only) may appear to consolidate this boundary, separating governance from
management. In emphasising and facilitating the oversight role of the NED, this
board structure (no longer unitary in practice) paradoxically places great power in
the remaining executive board members, typically the CEO and CFO, who now
provide the link to the separate executive group. The impact of this shift in board
structure has not been studied but there can be little doubt that board dynamics must
have changed. The tasks involved in developing and sustaining the business model
span both groups.
5 Conclusion
The argument of this paper is that, for a board of directors, corporate governance
and sustaining and developing the company’s business model are essentially the
same thing. This is because the two systems entail the same goals and the same
activities by the board. There are some advantages to adopting a business model
approach to examining corporate governance because it integrates the conformance
and performance activities of the board and it eliminates any perceived tension
between what independent directors believe they have been appointed to undertake
and the precepts of the UK Corporate Governance Code. The business model
approach identifies an important omission from the UK Corporate Governance
Code, namely the need for directors to take responsibility for the company’s
relationships with stakeholders other than shareholders, an area of significance in
current discussions about corporate culture and ethics.
Viewing corporate governance through a business model lens offers a fresh
perspective on the role of the board which provides improved integration between
its strategic and compliance responsibilities. This can potentially enable a better
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understanding of how corporate governance contributes to the achievement of
corporate objectives, rather than acting as a constraint.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
Appendix: IASB (2010) management commentary: a framework
for presentation (extract)
Nature of the business
26 Management should provide a description of the business to help users of the
financial reports to gain an understanding of the entity and of the external
environment in which it operates. That information serves as a starting point for
assessing and understanding an entity’s performance, strategic options and
prospects. Depending on the nature of the business, management commentary
may include an integrated discussion of the following types of information:
(a) the industries in which the entity operates;
(b) the entity’s main markets and competitive position within those markets;
(c) significant features of the legal, regulatory and macro-economic environ-
ments that influence the entity and the markets in which the entity operates;
(d) the entity’s main products, services, business processes and distribution
methods; and
(e) the entity’s structure and how it creates value.
IASB (2010: 12).
Relationships
33 Management should identify the significant relationships that the entity has with
stakeholders, how those relationships are likely to affect the performance and value
of the entity, and how those relationships are managed. This type of disclosure helps
users of the financial reports to understand how an entity’s relationships influence
the nature of its business and whether an entity’s relationships expose the business
to substantial risk.
IASB (2010: 14).
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